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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

provision of that act giving finality to the common pleas judgment. Instead of
quashing the appeal, the court affirmed the judgment of the common pleas.
This case and the case of Battles v. Nesbit would appear to be cases like
Murdy v. McCutcheon, supra, in which the appeal was entertained because no
motion to quash was made and the court overlooked the fact that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
This raises the question as to the effect, if any, to be given to rules of law
enunciated in opinions written by appellate court judges in cases in which they
themselves say they have no jurisdiction. That, however, is another story.

THE REVIVAL OF JUDGMENTS
In Simmons v. Simmons, 346 Pa. 52 and 150 S.C. 393, and in Ellinger v.
Krach, 346 Pa. 52 and 150 S.C. 384, it was finally decided that when land, which
is subject to the lien of a judgment, is conveyed by a deed which is recorded within
five years from the entry of the judgment, the lien of the judgment binds the land
in the possession of the terre-tenant for a period of five years from the date of the
recording of the deed, even though the judgment is not subsequently revived against
the judgment debtor by scire facias within five years of the entry of the judgment.
The Supreme Court opinion was handed down on January 1st, 1943. On
May 28th, 1943, Act 325 was approved by the Governor. Section 4 of the act
provides that it became effective immediately upon final enactment. The full text
of the act appears in the advance sheets of District and County Reports of August
16th, 1943, at page 97a.
Section 3 of the act repeals the act of April 16th, 1849, P. L. 663, 12 P. S.
sLc. 872, which provided as follows:
"Inall cases when a judgment has been or shall be regularly revived
between the original parties, the period of five years, during which
the lien of the judgment continues, shall only commence to run in
favor of the terre-tenant from the time that he or she has placed their
deed on record: Provided, That this act shall not apply to any cases
which have been finally adjudicated, or when the terre-tenant is in
actual possession of the land bound by such judgment, by himself
or tenant.
The Supreme Court merely adopted "the judgment" of the Superior Court in
these cases and did not discuss the question involved. In the Superior Court Judge
Kenworthy and Judge Rhodes each wrote dissenting opinions. For other strong
criticism of these decisions, see 91 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 568 and 17 Temple Univ.
Law Quarterly 99.
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Few statutes have been a more prolific source of controversy. The act was
intended to protect creditors who might be ignorant of a transfer, as when the
transferee neither goes into possession nor records his deed, and to enable a creditor
to preserve his lien by a revival against his debtor alone in such cases, giving him
five additional years to bring in the terre-tenant after he has recorded his deed or
taken possession.
Tht act of 1849 purports to apply only to cases in which a judgment is regularly revived between the original parties. In the instant cases this was not done
and the conclusion reached appears to ignore this statutory condition. Judge
Rhodes says that the plaintiff's failure to revive within five years from the date of
the judgment against the judgment debtor operated to take the case out of the
terms of the act and he lost the benefit of it.
Prior Supreme Court decisions were construed by Judge Keller as holding
that the conveyance of land by a judgment debtor subject to the judgment by deed
recorded within five years of the entry of the judgment, of itself, has the effect
of continuing the lien of the judgment against the land conveyed for five years
from the date the terre-tenant records his deed or takes possession of the land.
The proviso in the Act of 1849 was held to apply only to cases where the terretenant neither records his deed nor takes possession within five years of the entry of
the judgment.
In such cases the terre-tenant escapes exactly as if the land had been conveyed
after the expiration of the five-year period, when the creditor fails to revive against
his debtor.
Judge Kenworthy thought the Supreme Court decisions did not justify the conclusion reached by the majority of the Superior Court. The majority in effect held
that the lien of the judgment as to land conveyed was automatically revived for five
years by the recording of the deed while the judgment was still a lien on the land
conveyed. This is a new method of reviving judgments but, of course, it would
not affect the lien of the judgment as to lands which the debtor had not conveyed.
In all the prior cases the judgment had been regularly revived between the
original parties either by sci. fa. or by death of the debtor before the judgment was
five years old. The instant cases were cases of first impression on their peculiar facts.
The legislature evidently did not approve of the conclusion reached by the courts.
The Act of 1943 provides that the lien of a judgment shall continue for five
years only as to purchasers, mortgagees and other lien creditors, though it may continue longer as to lands of the debtor not conveyed or mortgaged and provided there
are no other liens which may acquire priority by entry in the meantime.
The terre-tenant whose deed is on record must be joined in any proceeding to
revive a judgment or he is unaffected by such proceeding. The act says nothing
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about the terre-tenant whose deed is not recorded. Presumably revival between
the original parties will continue the lien for five years against the land conveyed.
Prior to November 28th, 1943, (within six months from the enactment of the
act) judgments may be revived as to terre-tenants whose deeds had not been
recorded for five years, unless the five-year period expired within the six months,
in which case revival has to be had before the expiration of the five-year period.
The act says nothing about possession giving the same constructive notice as
recording of the deed but section 2 does require service of the sci. fa. on all persons
occupying the real estate.
It was held in Farmers N. B. & T. Co. v. Barrett, 321 Pa. 273, that the creditor
has five years from the recording of the terre-tenant's deed to revive as against him
and that he need not be.joined in a sci. fa. against the judgment debtor but may be
served with a second sci. fa. on the original judgment at any time within the five-year
period from the date his deed was recorded, even though his deed was on record
when the first sci. fa. was issued.
It was evidently the legislative purpose to change this rule and to enable a
terre-tenant, whose deed is on record when a judgment is revived, to feel that his
land will be free from the lien of the judgment, if he is not made a party to the
original sci. fa.
A judgment is now a lien for only five years, not only as to land of the debtor
but also as to land conveyed subject to the lien of the judgnment, if the terre-tenant
puts his deed on record. Revival before recording or taking possession will extend
the lien for five years from the date of the judgment of revival.

THE DUTY OF AN INSURER TO ACT
PROMPTLY ON APPLICATION
This problem of whether or not a duty rests upon an insurer to act promptly
upon application, although not arising too frequently, does come into the limelight
in certain types of insurance, where the agent is not authorized to complete the
contract, and where the contract is not completed prior to the decease of the insured.
In many types of insurance one deals solely with an authorized agent who is
authorized to complete the contract. But in other types the agent is authorized
only to transmit the application to the home office of the company. It is in these
latter cases where through carelessness or some other factor, a delay has been
caused in the deliyery of the policy, that our question becomes one of importance.
To better understand our problem, let us look at the following hypothetical case:

